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Mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS) is a conscious tactile sensation in the observer when watching
somebody else being touched. Two disparate theories have been suggested to explain MTS.
The threshold theory links MTS to hyper-activity in the parietal-frontal mirror neuron system,
while the self-other theory attributes MTS to impaired self-other representations in temporal-
parietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Here, I propose that these two
theories can be synthesized under a unified social motor cognition theory which states that action
observation engages two complementary levels of cognitive processing: a lower-level, physical
process regarding basic sensory-motor aspects of the action, which supports motor imitation
and goal understanding, and an abstract mental level concerning attribution of mental states,
which supports inferring others’ minds and self-other distinctions. While the physical process
preferentially recruits the mirror neuron system, the mental process depends critically on the
mentalizing network comprised of TPJ and mPFC. Importantly, despite of these anatomical
and functional dissimilarities, the mirroring and mentalizing processes involve shared predictive
coding, which is a general computational principle for a wide range of prominent concepts inmotor
cognition.
INTRODUCTION
Mirror-touch synaesthesia (MTS) is a special kind of tactile sensation in one’s own body when
seeing someone else being touched (Blakemore et al., 2005). While MTS people constitute only
a minority (1.6%), studying the neural underpinnings of MTS provides important insights into
the mechanisms of sensory, motor, and social cognitive functions in the brain. Although MTS
has drawn increasing attention from the field of psychology and neuroscience in recent years, the
underlyingmechanisms remain largely controversial. As summarized recently inWard and Banissy
(2015), two different theories have been put forward to account for MTS. The threshold theory
posits that MTS synaesthetes exhibit hyper-activity in the mirror neuron system, which leads to
heightened somatosensory activation crossing certain perceptual threshold (Blakemore et al., 2005;
Bolognini et al., 2013). The self-other theory claims that MTS is associated with impaired ability
to distinguish self from others in temporal-parietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex
(mPFC) (Banissy and Ward, 2013; Holle et al., 2013).
As mentioned in passing by Ward and Banissy (2015), the two theories are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. Yet, it fails to offer specific explanations and/or speculations as to how the two
disparate theories might be related. Here, I propose a unified social motor cognition theory which
not only conceptually incorporates these two theories, but also potentially serves as a coherent,
parsimonious interpretation for a broader range of prominent action cognition concepts that are
closely related to MTS. Below, I will first address the concept that the threshold theory and the self-
other theory reflect nothing but two complementary levels of cognitive processing during action
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observation. I will then elaborate and discuss the shared neural
codes and computational principles between these two cognitive
processes.
COMPLEMENTARY PROCESSING DURING
ACTION OBSERVATION: MIRRORING AND
MENTALIZING
Contemporary view in social motor cognition holds that
action observation triggers two different levels of cognitive
processing which are supported by distinct brain systems
(De Lange et al., 2008; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009).
The lower-level, physical processing concerns basic sensory-
motor and kinematic representations, which are good for
motor imitation and for prediction of sensory outcome of
an observed action to facilitate goal understanding (Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia, 2010). It is generally accepted that the physical
mirroring aspects of action recognition are supported by the
mirror neuron system, located primarily in the frontal-parietal
circuits comprised of ventral premotor cortex, dorsal premotor
cortex, and anterior intraparietal sulcus (Gallese and Goldman,
1998). In contrast, the higher-level, abstract mentalizing process
involves attributing mental states (thoughts, desires, intention,
etc) to oneself and to others, which supports inferring others’
minds, self-awareness, and self-other distinctions (Frith and
Frith, 2006; Lieberman, 2007). The mentalizing process engages
a distinct set of brain networks mainly including area TPJ, area
mPFC, and posterior superior temporal sulcus (Amodio and
Frith, 2006; Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009). The mirroring
and mentalizing systems are two anatomically distinct yet
functionally complementary aspects of action recognition during
social interactions (Mainieri et al., 2013; Spunt and Lieberman,
2013; Ciaramidaro et al., 2014; Sperduti et al., 2014).
Themirroring andmentalizing systems are often differentially
recruited, depending on specific task demands and social-
cognitive contexts. For instance, it has been shown that
participants show increased activations in the mentalizing system
when thinking about why an action in a video clip was performed,
comparing to thinking about what the action was and how the
action was performed (Spunt et al., 2011). Similarly, observations
of familiar actions that have pre-existing sensory and motor
repertoires preferentially activate the mirroring neuron system
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2005), while observations of unfamiliar
actions more strongly recruit the mentalizing network, probably
reflecting the increased demand of mental inferences in order
to make sense of novel actions (Brass et al., 2007). As such, the
threshold theory for MTS likely reflects abnormal processing
at a mirroring level, while the self-other theory corresponds to
atypical representations at a mental level. In this way, the two
competing theories are not separate theories for explaining MTS.
Instead, they should be viewed as reflecting two complementary
aspects of cognitive processes during touch observation, which
work synergistically to ensure appropriate social interactions in a
given behavioral context.
The dichotomy between the mirroring and mentalizing
processes captures not only the threshold theory and the
self-other theory, but also may explain a few additional
concepts associated with MTS. For instance, the dichotomy
suggests that self-other distinction should operate at both the
mental and physical levels: the former refers to psychologically
separating oneself from others and plays a role in self-awareness
(Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011) and empathy (Decety and Jackson,
2004), while the latter supports several aspects of bodily self-
consciousness (Ionta et al., 2011a; Blanke et al., 2014), which
includes senses of body ownership (Tsakiris et al., 2007), sense
of agency (Jeannerod, 2003; Jackson and Decety, 2004), as well
as processing related to self-location and first-person perspective
(Ionta et al., 2011b). Interestingly, people with MTS often exhibit
various aspects of these anomalous self-experience at both the
mental and physical body levels (Ward and Banissy, 2015), which
can be parsimoniously interpreted as aberrant representations in
themirroring andmentalizing systems during touch observation.
SHARED CODING PRINCIPLES BETWEEN
MIRRORING AND MENTALIZING:
PREDICTIVE CODING
The mirroring and mentalizing systems might have shared
predictive coding principle. First, at the physical mirroring
level, goal understanding, sense of agency, and bodily self
awareness are each associated with predictive processing. Goal
understanding hinges on the ability to make predictions about
the consequence and sensory outcome of an observed action
(Kilner et al., 2007). This prediction is thought to be based on
efference copies of the mapped motor representations in the
observer during action observation (Gallese and Goldman, 1998;
Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2010). Sense of agency depends critically
on the congruency between the predicted sensory outcome and
the actual sensory feedback associated with an action (Tsakiris
et al., 2007). In a similar vein, a predictive coding account of
bodily self awareness (Apps and Tsakiris, 2014) proposes that,
recognizing one’s self is a probabilistic process of multimodal
integration between the actual sensory states (re-afference) and
other bodily related information including predictions based
on corollary discharge (efference). Second, at the abstract
mentalizing level, theory of mind engages simulations of one’s
own intentions, desires, and beliefs to predict the mental
states of others. This allows an individual to understand and
empathize with others (Decety and Jackson, 2004). Our brain
may be constantly making predictions at distinct levels during
action observation, and deficits in these predictive processing
will result in social-cognitive abnormalities such as MTS and
neuropsychiatric symptoms including autism spectrum disorders
(Van Boxtel and Lu, 2013) and schizophrenia (Biedermann et al.,
2012).
Predictive coding is not restricted to social-cognitive
processing. Instead, it is considered to be a general coding
principle which underlies a wide variety of perceptual and
motor functions (Brown and Brune, 2012). Take the field of
motor cognition as an example, predictive coding has been
well-established as the core principle for several prominent
concepts. For instance, it serves as the underlying mechanism
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for adaptive motor control (Shadmehr et al., 2010; Franklin
and Wolpert, 2011) and motor awareness (Blakemore and
Frith, 2003; Desmurget and Sirigu, 2009), both of which involve
internal forward predictions of sensory consequence of executed
actions. It should be noted that, while forward models of action
are framed in a predictive scheme, the underlying mechanisms
involve neural computations specifically related to efference
copy signals (or “corollary discharge”), which are different
from predictive computations implemented in other brain
functions such as visual processing (Rao and Ballard, 1999),
associative learning (Schultz and Dickinson, 2000), and decision
making (Rushworth et al., 2009). In addition to action execution,
predictive coding has also been linked to concepts related to
action selection and planning in a recent neurophysiology
study (Kuang et al., 2016). It is shown that when monkeys are
planning an arm movement, neurons in posterior parietal cortex
encode not only the intended physical movement but also the
visual sensory anticipation of the planned movement. These
predictive coding of planned action support the longstanding
ideomotor theory in cognitive psychology, which states that
actions are planned and selected with respect to their perceptual
consequences (Shin et al., 2010; Waszak et al., 2012). More
broadly, the co-existence of physical and visual predictive
representations in the same brain area is very reminiscent of the
idea of common coding theory which posits a tight bi-directional
link between action and perception systems (Prinz, 1987;
Hommel et al., 2001).
CONCLUSION
In summary, this paper provides a synthetic view for
understanding MTS from the perspective of a unified social
motor cognition theory. Instead of two competing, disparate
theories, I propose that MTS is attributable to the disturbed
mirroring and mentalizing functions, which represent the dual
complementary aspects of cognitive processing with shared
predictive coding during touch observation. Thus, the current
unified viewpoint may serve as a coherent guiding principle
for explaining diverse aspects of bodily and mentally abnormal
phenomena in MTS populations.
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